

**How not to defend compatibilism about Bayesianism and  
Inference to the Best Explanation**

*Valeriano Iranzo*

*Universitat de València*

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Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation (Bay and IBE, hereafter) are two distinctive approaches to non-deductive inference. Bayesian confirmation theory does not explicitly allude to explanatory value even though it has been extensively argued that it plays an effective role in the comparative assessment of scientific hypotheses. IBE, in its turn, has been criticized on account of its vagueness. According to this, a “happy marriage” would be welcome. In my talk I will discuss two different ways to defend compatibility between Bay and IBE (output-compatibility and value-compatibility) and I will defend that: (i) just partial compatibility can be obtained, and (ii) although partial compatibility by itself is not very rewarding, it paves the way for a more enriching relation between Bay and IBE (i.e.: a supplementary relation, indeed). After discarding those alleged supplementary views which assign different tasks to Bay and IBE, I will try to show that, nonetheless, they may work in tandem.