SHARING REASONS
2nd Valencia Philosophy Workshop Valencia, June 11-12, 2020

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Gaslighting as manipulation of reason-sharing practices
Javier González de Prado (UNED, Madrid)

Communicative practices make it possible to share reasons with others. When such sharing is successful, the target audience gains access to reasons previously unavailable to them. However, communicative interactions can also have the opposite effect, making the audience lose access to some of their (apparent) reasons. In particular, agents can be inappropriately deprived of their reasons by speakers that exploit their perceived epistemic authority to manipulate their targets into doubting their own assessment of the available reasons. As a result of this dent in their self-trust, the victims of such manipulations may lose their grip on some of their reasons – they may stop being in a position to rely competently on those reasons. I suggest that this is how gaslighting works. An upshot of my discussion is that yielding to gaslighting may not involve any form of irrationality on the part of the victim. Being part of social practices of sharing reasons exposes us to manipulations like gaslighting, which can only be held in check by collective responses, and not just by individual resistance.

Theory and Practice of Epistemic Fraternities

Fernando Broncano (Carlos III, Madrid)

Standpoint Theory claims that oppressed groups have a sort of epistemic advantage to understand the social relationships in which they are immersed. This theory from Lukács was revisited by the feminism of identity. By contrast, Miranda Fricker's thesis of hermeneutic injustice maintains that people who suffer oppression lack the common hermeneutical resources to understand their social position. This paper sets out the question of whether it is possible to overtake this tension by the so- called praxis. I propose the hypothesis that certain groupings, "epistemic fraternities", operate as educational agents able to generate common hermeneutical resources.

Spanish Version: *Interseccionalidad y fraternidades epistémicas: después de la controversia del standpoint.*

La teoría del *standpoint* sostiene la hipótesis de que las clases o grupos oprimidos tienen una ventaja epistemológica sobre los grupos aventajados por el hecho de que su experiencia se duplica: atiende a la experiencia propia como identidad subordinada y a la experiencia de los grupos dominantes. Fue elaborada por Lukàcs en *Historia y conciencia de clase* pero fue el feminismo de la diferencia el movimiento que la resucitó en los años ochenta. La tesis de Sandra Harding y Nancy Hartsock era que las mujeres tenían una mayor capacidad para atender a los datos que los varones bajo un régimen patriarcal. En los años noventa, el feminismo negro e hispano y los estudios queer criticaron agriamente esta teoría con el argumento de que suponía una identidad fuerte, como la de "mujer" (o "clase proletaria") que imponía generalizaciones normativas inadmisibles (de hecho, se afirmaba, implicaba una noción normativa de género reducida al sexo). Frente a esta teoría nació la idea de interseccionalidad como una teoría de la identidad fracturada, liminal, que supone una ontología compleja de las identidades y una epistemología pluralista y contextualista. Linda Alcoff y José Medina son dos claros defensores de esta segunda opción.

Mi presentación, muy tentativa y en proceso, parte de un alineamiento con la noción de interseccionalidad, que recoge la idea de fallos en el autoconocimiento debido a las fracturas entre las varias identidades que construyen los sujetos contemporáneos, que conduce a una opacidad sistémica y a una dificultad no menos sistémica para reconocer cuál es el otro relevante y el otro dominador. Sin embargo, observo que la idea de epistemologías resistentes que ha elaborado José Medina contiene una tensión interna que concede mucho más de lo que quisiera a la teoría del *standpoint*, y es una tensión no fácilmente soluble. Medina no acepta la teoría del *standpoint* pero en su libro acepta una suerte de teoría simétrica: la de que las posiciones dominantes conllevan casi necesariamente cegueras y metacegueras.

De nuevo, muy tentativamente, recuperaré algunas ideas de la teoría del standpoint y en particular examinaré las posibilidades de conceptualizar la idea de virtudes epistémicas de la agencia, una versión refinada de la vieja idea de *praxis*, proponiendo la idea de fraternidades epistémicas como algo menos que las identidades fuertes y algo más que una concepción puramente sumativa de comunidad epistémica. Para ello me basaré en cómo construir una idea operativa de "recursos epistémicos comunes" como condición necesaria para resolver los problemas que plantea Miranda Fricker con su tesis (anti-privilegio) de la injusticia hermenéutica, que no es sino una formulación epistémica de la opacidad en la construcción de la experiencia.

Sharing Knowledge
Jesús Vega (Autonomous U. of Madrid)

I know that p; by telling that p, I share my knowledge that p with others. What are the conditions for sharing knowledge with others by telling them that p? In principle, by transmitting my knowledge that p, I do not share the reasons I have (whatever they are) for believing that p. But, by telling you that p, do I give you a reason to believe that p? Which kind of reason? Is it a reason that I share with you in the very act of telling? My telling you that p *does* constitute a reason for you to believe that p; it *does* have epistemic import; it has it in virtue of speaker and hearer participating in a rule-governed practice of sharing knowledge, that is, in virtue of the mutual understanding of the normative standing of the practice and the kind of reasons the practice contributes to institute. This standing is grounded on the mutual acknowledgment of being involved in a situation of epistemic dependence.

Games and Artworks

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Videogames are an interesting example of objects that, at least in some cases and *prima facie*, have a dual nature: they are games, and they are also (better or worse) artworks, more specifically fictional artworks. Some authors have contested this view. From a Suits-inspired perspective on games that I broadly share, Rough (2018) argues that artworks cannot be games. More specifically, Kania (2018) argues that players of videogames cannot be performers of artworks, as they should if videogames are also artworks on the most plausible account of their characteristic *interactivity* (Gaut 2010). Here I will present the account I have provided elsewhere of games on the one hand (García-Carpintero forthcoming) and fictional artworks on the other (García-Carpintero 2019), to rescue the intuitive possibility of artworks games that some videogames illustrate from Rough's and Kania's arguments. On the account, both games and artworks are defined by constitutive rules (as in the Wittgensteinian language-games tradition), but there is a different functional story that explains why their defining rules are accepted or enforced – i.e., why the normative reasons their rules provide to those beholden to them are shared, to connect with the topic of the workshop. Two distinguishable sets of attitudes we value for their own sake and may fully occupy our attention in favorable cases play a crucial role in that teleological story, the *aesthetic attitude* on the one hand, and the *lusory attitude* on the other. The view then allows a reply to Rough's and Kania's considerations by pointing out other cases of objects that may aim to serve (and even succeed fairly well in doing so) the functions of artworks and other functions, as in architecture or design, including also cases allowing or requiring the relevant sort of interactivity. Given time constraints, the argument will be just partially abductive: the only reason to be offered here for the functionalist constitutive rules account will lie in the way it defends the *prima facie* plausible intuitive view on (some) videogames from Rough's and Kania's arguments.

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Sharing Artistic Reasons
Filippo Contesi (University of Barcelona)

In this talk I aim to offer a preliminary analysis of the relative lack of attention many contemporary definitions of art (as opposed to more traditional ones) have appeared to pay to the role of shared reasons in art appreciation. It is common to draw a distinction between (the phenomena of) art and the aesthetic. The distinction is often drawn by pointing out that some (successful) works of art are not aesthetically valuable and that some aesthetically valuable things are not art. Notoriously more controversial are instead the issues of how to define the two phenomena. The distinction between art and the aesthetic is, as a consequence, difficult to characterize with much precision. However, one plausible component of the distinction is that the appreciation of art requires of appreciators some sort of an understanding of the artist's intention. In the philosophy of fiction, for instance, it is common to attribute to an artist the "reflexive intention" that appreciators imagine the fiction's content because they recognize the artist's intention that they so imagine. If all goes to plan, such a recognition is therefore a reason that fiction appreciators (are meant to) share among them. At least in this sense, then, art appreciation fundamentally involves an activity of sharing reasons. So the following questions arise. How fundamental is this activity to art? Are there any other ways in which sharing reasons is important in art? Should contemporary philosophy of art pay greater attention to shared reasons?

Nurse Dolls and the Reasons We Are Bound to Share

Josep E. Corbí (University of Valencia)

Imagining tends to be conceived of as a rather private and erratic activity. Engaging in daydreaming sounds thus like a prototypical case of imagining. But, as Kendall Walton (1990) points out, this is far from true. Imagining is quite often a cooperative activity. His notion of a prop allows us to shift from a view of imagining as private and erratic to an approach where reasons are involved and shared. Walton's approach takes for granted that all prescriptions are internal to each particular game and, therefore, only concern those who decide to participate in any such game. I will argue, though, that props like dolls not only prescribe to imagine certain sorts of contents whenever you use them in a certain game of make-belief, but they may also prescribe you to engage in some such games. How are these two sorts of prescriptions established, though? Following up on Butler (2011), I will argue (a) that gendering involves our engagement in games of make-belief and (b) that agents do not decide to engage in such games and take their prescriptions as reasons to act one or another way, but rather such prescriptions provide inescapable reasons for their actions insofar as they are shared in specific sense, namely, that they are the product of some reiterative -and pervasive- practice of citational interpellation that have formed not only their understanding of what demands a true subject must meet but also what their respective position is with respect to those demands is. I will finally examine Banksy's painting where a boy plays with a certain nurse doll as if she were a superhero to further the relevance of props in the articulation of the reasons we are bound to share.

To Dance with Others.
Personal and interpersonal bodily experience as a space from which sharing reasons
Carmen Martínez-Sáez (University of Valencia)

An ordinary Monday morning, the choreographers Wilfried van Poppel and Amaya Lubeigt arrive at a high school, to meet a group of pupils and begin a project that will last until next Friday. During five days, the teenagers leave their school desks aside in order to experience their bodies, to dance and to rehearse a half an hour choreography with their own bodies as the only instruments. Whenever a project starts, Amaya and Wilfried ask themselves the same question: "How are they going to react?" The documentary-film *Five Days to Dance* (2014) tells how a group of pupils from a high school in Donostia react when they were confronted by the easy, and, complex experience which Amaya tells at the beginning of the film: "When we say to them: 'Don't do anything, just look ahead and put your arms beside your body.' It seems like you are doing nothing, but you feel like you are naked. The effect is even more if there are people looking at you. Because, then, what are they seeing? They are seeing you." As we can see in the film, the way we look ahead, the way we place our hands, our body, our facial expressions, show the way we respond to that feeling of being naked, of being exposed. Albeit the camera has a non-judging view, we can see different initial reactions. Some of the students move and look in a shy way, others move and look fearfully, sometimes they are so frightened they are unable to look, some of them have indifferent reactions, others answer teasingly, some of them even feel plenty of shame. But, surprisingly, a lot of these gestures have changed by the time of the performance on Friday. Some of the students even say that the project allows them to change the way they deal with the feeling of being exposed, which allows them to be capable of dealing with the bullying they suffered in the past,; which is something that could not have been solved through the current lessons.

This experience shows that the body has a relevant role in the way we narrate ourselves and the way we narrate other people. This suggests a fundamental question: (a) Can a bodily experience transform the way we narrate ourselves and others and, consequently, the space from which we share reasons? Before this it's necessary to answer a previous query: (b) What is the role of our body in the narration we make about ourselves? I will try to outline some answers appealing to the fact that "fear is there, alive, in the features" (Wittgenstein PI, 537).

The psychedelic experience: a new perspective, a new attitude towards the world to share reasons?

Virginia Ballesteros

In my presentation, I would like to explore the role that altered states of consciousness may play in the sharing of reasons. In particular, I will focus on the mystical-type experiences enabled by psychedelic drugs. Psychedelics are naturally occurring or chemically designed substances, usually agonists of the serotonin 2A receptor—such as psilocybin or LSD— known for their ability to alter cognition and perception, and more importantly, to induce altered states of consciousness. The term *psychedelic* was introduced in the mid-twentieth century to point to the *mind-manifesting* effects exerted by these substances. For decades, there has been a debate about whether the experience enabled by psychedelics was of a genuinely mystical nature. Here I will position myself in favor of it, assuming that—when taken in a supportive environment and with a certain mindset—psychedelic drugs do enable a mystical-type experience, since it presents certain key features of mysticism, such as those encompassed by Freud's concept of Oceanic Boundlessness: i.e. insightfulness, a blissful state, experience of unity, and experience of spirituality.

The hypothesis I want to put forward is that because of the nature of the psychedelic experience, it can be meaningful enough to change our whole outlook on life and the world, and thus make us receptive to reasons that did not appeal to us before. In this sense, I think it can lay the foundations to share reasons. To explore this hypothesis, I will draw on the testimonials of several people who narrate such a life-changing experience: it is very common to find in these testimonials the idea that the psychedelic experience offers *a new perspective*, a perspective that also shows itself to be true and valuable. As a philosophical framework for articulating this proposal, I will turn to Wittgenstein, since both the mystical nature of the experience and the fact that it is often cast in terms of *a change in perspective* seem to invite us to resort to the work of this philosopher. My point is that by bringing out a whole new outlook on the world and on life, a new attitude towards the world also appears, allowing us to consider and share new reasons, especially about what's valuable in life.

Can We Make Sense of Impossible Obligations?

Carlos Patarroyo (Universidad del Rosario)

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The maxim "ought implies can" asserts something fairly intuitive, that is, that a necessary condition for having a moral obligation to perform some action is that the agent be able (i.e. has the capacity and oportunity) to perform it. This maxim can be stated as follows:

(OIC): Necessarily, S ought to φ only if S can φ.

If the maxim is wright, then there are no impossible obligations; that is, a moral obligation for S to act when S cannot perform the action (I'm leaving aside *weak* interpretations of "ought" like H. M. Hare's in his famous book *Freedom and Reason*; I'm not interested in defenses that describe this obligations as "ideal". Far from it, I'm interested in *binding* moral obligations, or *full force* obligations -to use Hare's own terminology-).

If I promised to pick you up at the airport and remembered this commitment just now, when it's to late to do so, am I relieved of my obligation to fulfil my promise? If I ask a friend "what should I do" and she says "you must keep your promise" knowing is impossible for mi to do so, she must be speaking metaphorically or, as Sinnott-Armstrong defends, she must be making a conversational implicature, hinting that I should do something else.

The latter presupposes there are moral obligations that can be cancelled (depending on the circumstances) and then replaced by others closely related to them and within the grasp of my agency (since I cannot pick you up at the airport I have the obligation to do the next best thing within my possibilities, perhaps reimburse you for the cab ride and apologize to you).

Lets now think of a situation in which there is a conflict between two options in which I have two opposite and mutually excluding obligations (a dilemma). If we follow the strategy just used in the airport example, then it should be possible to calculate the best option within my grasp and thus substitute or compensate the unfulfilled obligation somehow. This approach treats all moral obligations as replaceable or cancellable (it would just all depend on the circumstances).

There is some appeal on the idea of at least some moral values and obligations not being "negotiable" (cancellable or compensable). If such a thing were possible, then there would be situations in which a person cannot comply with an obligation and yet the obligation cannot be cancelled or replaced. So, if we embrace *moral value pluralism* we could, in principle, defend the possibility of impossible obligations. Were they possible, what would be their function? What would it mean to have an obligation impossible to fulfill?

Practical Reasons for Theoretical Commitments: In Favor of Moral Responsibility

Carlos J. Moya (University of Valencia)

I hold that having free will and moral responsibility are part of our value and dignity as human beings and that this is a practical reason for the belief that we do possess those properties. This raises the issue of the relationship between theoretical research and practical commitments. In this respect, we should note that, unlike what happens in some other fields, there are no decisive proofs or arguments either for or against the reality of those properties, which gives practical considerations a special relevance. But we can also consider some ethical or axiological judgments, concerning the absolute impermissibility of certain practices, as part of a modus tollens of sorts, whose conclusion speaks up against denying the indicated properties. I illustrate these views with a text of Hanna Arendt, where she prevents against assimilating crime to vice and denying individual responsibility. Refusing to take someone as a responsible agent involves regarding him or her as someone with whom we cannot share reasons. I end my talk with some texts by a drug addict where he vindicates his free will and moral responsibility against a therapeutic view of addicts.

Shared Projects and Moral Luck
Sergi Rosell (University of Valencia)

Projects depend for their development on many factors beyond the agent's control. Among these factors there are some that have an intrinsic connection with the project, so that if they do not turn out as expected the project itself fails; while there are other factors whose connection with the project is merely accidental, so that if they do not occur the project cannot be carried out but it is not invalidated (B. Williams). This distinction is important because the value of a project does not necessarily depend of its (full) implementation, but it lies in its role for articulating a meaningful narrative that guides action.

Moreover, most of our projects are shared with others, and we can share them in many different ways. A fundamental feature of shared projects is the need to share, among project participants, certain beliefs and desires about the very nature of the project and how to implement it. This can also be done in many different ways. Another central factor in shared projects is that participants depend mutually on their individual contributions, although all participants' contributions need not be equally relevant. It is therefore of fundamental importance that the project participants are suitable in the sense that they are those who can make the desired contributions to the project.

In this talk I will try to characterize with some more precision the idea of a shared project and I will draw a distinction between the bad luck of not having had the right participants in the project and the bad luck that, having had the right participants, they were not able to make the desired contributions (due to extrinsic factors to the project). This distinction is not always clear, but when fixed it involves two different kinds of failure that elicit very different forms of regret. In the latter case the relevant thought is "We failed at some point", whereas the former is about the more basic failure of a deep mismatch between a project and its participants. I will also touch on some difficulties of shared projects, such as that we cannot always choose those with whom we share our projects, or that participants may conceive the project differently. Finally, I will connect this with *moral* luck.

Radicalized Thinking: Abstract Understanding without Intuitive Grasp

Mirja Pérez de Calleja (Los Andes University, Bogotá)

I will discuss a psychological phenomenon which I call radicalization of thinking, whose roots and sustaining conditions are very often political besides psychological. The person's way to think and reason about a set of questions becomes more simplistic and dichotomistic, while their identification with their views increases. They start thinking of difficult complex questions – whose complexity and difficulty they used to acknowledge in thought – as if these were easy and simple, with an increasing confidence and intransigence. They increasingly tend to choose absolute answers to questions that admit of degree, and in many cases they become fond of all-encompassing explanations or all-purpose principles. However, persons whose thinking about some set of questions radicalizes in this way do not gain access to new information or arguments that justify adopting more simplistic views; nor do they forget reasons for doubts and reservations; nor do they cease to understand aspects of reality that they used to understand. But, I suggest, their understanding of some facts ceases to have its due impact on their agential mechanisms, because it becomes disconnected from intuitive and affective mechanisms of perception and understanding. They still understand abstractly those nuances and difficulties, and they can consider these in conscious reflection, but only in a deficient way that shows a lack of a more intuitive and direct understanding. Thus, their reasoning about certain questions becomes defective as they start ignoring with no justification (or proceeding, in honest critical scrutiny, as though they ignored) subtleties, objections, and possibilities of error that they used to recognize and take into account not long ago. They thereby lose some form of sensitivity to reasons and lose touch with reality to some degree, despite meeting several reasons-sensitivity conditions for autonomy that have been offered in the philosophical literature. I offer a characterization of the kind of sensitivity to reasons that radicalized subjects (as I describe them) lack, with the hope of helping to illuminate in what ways these subjects' loss of touch with reality is different from psychopaths', from schizophrenics', and from the loss of touch with reality that is involved in failing to ever gain access to certain facts because of one's culture and upbringing.

Reasons for Emotion and Reasons for Action Out of Emotion

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As part of his case for a sentimentalist approach to value, John Skorupski has argued for the Bridge Principle: 'Whatever facts give x reason to feel Ø give x reason to do the Ø-prompted action, in virtue of being a reason to feel Ø' (Skorupski 2010). The Bridge Principle, according to Skorupski, therefore transmits justificatory force from appropriate emotion to the action that the emotion 'prompts.' For instance, if the Bridge Principle is true, I would have reason to hide my face in virtue of having reason for shame, if hiding my face is the action that shame prompts. According to Skorupski, reasons for emotion are sui generis, and hence the Bridge Principle is a distinctive and irreducible source of reasons for action. In this paper I will offer a qualified defence of this sentimentalist view. However, I will also argue that Skorupski does not offer a convincing explanation of the Bridge Principle's validity. The paper raises a number of questions that a defence of the Bridge Principle would have to address. For instance, what makes it the case that an action is 'prompted' by an emotion? How does the fact that an action is prompted by an appropriate emotion transmit justificatory force to the action? Does the Bridge Principle hold for all emotions or only some? Does the Bridge Principle hold whenever an emotion is 'fitting': that is, whenever a situation conforming to the 'formal object' of the emotion obtains? What conception of emotion would underpin a valid version of the Bridge Principle? Finally, and most fundamentally, in virtue of what does the Bridge Principle hold? That is, why should we accept a view of practical reason that accommodates the Bridge Principle rather than one that does not? I argue that a defence of the Bridge Principle that is able to answer these questions would take us in a very different direction from Skorupski's own defence of it.

The Rationality of Genuine Expressions of Emotions
Marta Cabrera (University of Valencia)

Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) challenged the standard account of agency in light of a number of intentional actions that apparently could not be rationalised in terms of a proper combination of desires and beliefs. In this talk, I intend to further her case against the standard account and argue that some sorts of expressive behaviour, such as smiling for joy and blushing in shame, are not only hard to accommodate within that account, but call into question the notion of rationality that both Hursthouse and the standard account presuppose.

To this purpose, I will explore where the divide between an action and a mere happening may lie. Contrary to what is customarily assumed in the current debate, I will conclude that *simple expressive pieces of behaviour,* such as jumping for joy or covering one's face in shame, cannot plausibly be presented as actions while excluding from this condition *genuine facial expressions of emotions*, such as smiling for joy or frowning in anger (Hursthouse 1991, Goldie 2000, Betzler 2007 and 2009, Bennett 2016 and Müller and Wong 2019). My contention will then be that either both sorts of behaviour are to be identified as actions or neither is. The latter sounds rather problematic, though, as we would have to assimilate jumping for joy or covering one's face in shame to spasms, and this conflicts with the fact that we regard expressive behaviour as responses to a situation that are to be assessed as proportional or disproportional to it. If we turn to the former alternative instead, there will certainly be room to examine the proportionality or disproportionality of any such piece of behaviour, but it will imply a revision of the notion of rationality both Hursthouse and the standard account of our agency presuppose. This is, nevertheless, the option I will favour.

Besides the revision of such notion of rationality, this last option allows us to examine the kind of reasons that might be involved in our accounting for pieces of behaviour such as smiling, crying or frowning. Are these reasons merely explanatory or do they have any normative force? And, if so, are they reasons just for the person that smiles or cries or do they have any shared normative force such that they are, in some sense, reasons for anyone? The way we approach other people's genuine expressions of emotions and, especially, the way we tend to be moved by them seems to indicate that not responding to the reasons they may have for crying, smiling or frowning might, in some particular contexts, involve a failure of some sort on our part. In the context of a conversation, shared deliberation or even therapeutic practice, we might think that the reasons that our interlocutor has for expressing her emotions minimally require from us that we acknowledge them as such. Such acknowledgment might take the form of a subtle gesture or a larger display of behaviour, but there seems to be something wrong with remaining impassible to what our interlocutor is responding to. This might be explained by some kind of prima facie normativity associated to emotions, which might in turn be accounted for by emotions' close connection to our cares and concerns.

Shared Reasons and Truth
María Álvarez (Kings College London)

Suppose that both, you and I like dancing. You believe, mistakenly, that there will be dancing at the party tonight – whereas I know that there won't be any dancing at the party. Some philosophers have argued that, in this is a case, you *have* a (normative) reason to go the party. If so, this seems a normative reason that I cannot share with you, despite my love of dancing, because, given my knowledge, this is not a reason I can have. Using this example, I shall examine how considerations about rationality may shape our thinking about the relationship between sharing normative reasons and truth.

Explaining one's actions to others
Víctor Verdejo (University of Valencia)

Since the seminal work of Castañeda, Perry, Lewis and others, the crucial importance of first-person or de se thought in the explanation of action is a commonplace among philosophers. On this occasion, I propose to revisit this theme from the point of view of communication and, more precisely, a context in which we not only attempt to explain intentional action, but also account for the capacity to explain one's own actions to others. This angle makes visible, I argue, two key features of action explanation. Action explanation is essentially about the agent carrying out the action, but is likewise unproblematically accessible to subjects other than the agent. These features are especially challenging, I suggest, for both impersonal models of intentional action, and approaches that posit special and unshareable de se thoughts.

The Wise, the Fool and Internalism about Reasons

Eduardo Ortiz (Catholic University of Valencia)

Continuing to be alive and ceasing to be alive were the very distinct outcomes of the actions made by the two main characters of a quite well known classical narrative. Assuming the desire to be alive in both of them, there were reasons that favoured doing what one of them, but not the other, did in the particular situation in which they were immersed. The action done by one of them (the wise, W) reveals that there was no gap between her reasons and her desires (Williams 1981). On the other hand, the dramatic upshot of the action of the other agent (the fool, F) exhibits a gap between his reasons and his desires.

Internalists have offered two solutions to bridge the gap suffered by F. Because of an objection raised against the example model (F has reason to φ only if, were he R[1], he would want to φ) (Korsgaard 1986), the best solution seems to be the advice model (F has reason to φ only if, were he R, he would desire that his real self φ) (Smith 1994, 1995). Despite some problems that surround the advice model (e.g., it seems to link F's reason to φ with a desire *that F* φ and not with a desire *to* φ) (Johnson 1997), it can nevertheless be rescued by acknowledging that people use to take advice from other people (F has reason to φ only if someone, for instance W, who is R would advise him to φ).

Now, this move faces the problem that perhaps F's adviser, for instance W, is not worthy of trust, because though she is a good adviser (R), it can be the case that F may not recognize that the qualities of his adviser are the ones that constitute being a good adviser (R). In fact, disagreement about the qualities of R is not so exceptional. A way out of this difficulty is to appeal to the advisee's development, that is, an improved F is surely able to recognize that she who advises him, for instance W, is R (Wiland 2000, 2012).

Of course an improved fool (F) is not a fool, but someone who is wise (W) or, better, on the path to becoming wise. A transcendental argument opens the possibility of tracking the transition from F to W and to retrieve in this vein internalism about reasons.

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[1] R is a sufficiently informed, imaginative, strong-willed, etc., deliberator. He/she is a rational deliberator. In terms of the advice model, he/she is a good adviser.