Duration: 01/09/2024- 31/08/2027
Code: PID2023-151071NB-I00
Funded by: Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades

Principal Investigator: Jordi Valor (U. València) and Víctor Verdejo (UPF)
Research Team: Virginia Ballesteros (U. València), Josep Corbí (U València), Pablo Rychter (U. València) and Pilar Terrés (U. València).
Work Team: David Liggins (U. Manchester), Guy Longworth (U. Warwick), Lucy O’Brien (UCL), Joey Pollock (U. Oslo), Sònia Roca-Royes (U. Stirling), Valentí Simpson (U. València) and Ezequiel Zerbudis (CONICET).

SUMARY

Philosophical inquiry is closely related to the critical revision of assumptions and preconceived ideas in a variety of discourses. However, not all revisions have the same philosophical relevance. This research project aims to shed light on what determines the philosophical significance of a number of revisionist positions regarding a certain discourse, with special consideration to central problems that arise in the areas of communication, knowledge, and agency. From a normative perspective we explore the idea that a good number of the most relevant philosophical problems have their origin in (and call for the revision of) certain cognitive habits and basic dispositions that govern our world view and that we will call normative limits of our world view (NLWV).

The present project thus delves into the lines of research that emerged in the development of a previous research project: Eliminationism, Fictionalism and Expressivism. The possibility of a negative metaphysical verdict about a discourse D (EFE-VMN: PID2019-106420GA-I00). That project centered around the study and articulation of philosophical theories that defend anti-realist positions in various areas. The results obtained in this research bring out the need to deepen our understanding of the nature of philosophical projects that propose to significantly revise the cognitive habits and basic dispositions that guide our thoughts and actions in different discursive and practical fields.

The project starts with the following question: (1) What makes an antirealist position philosophically relevant? Our initial hypothesis is that what makes an anti-realist position philosophically relevant is the transgression and consequent revision of one or several NLWVs. The development of this hypothesis raises two other questions: (2) What can motivate the revision of a NLWV? (3) What forms can a revisionist project of a NLWV take? To answer (2) we advance the hypotheses that what motivates the revision of a NLWV are, first, the dissonances that originate in our perspective of the world and, second, the incorporation of new conceptual resources. With respect to (3), our hypothesis is that the forms that a revisionist project can take go beyond the antirealist strategies previously elucidated by the group (eliminationism, fictionalism, expressivism), and whose adequate characterization involves the idea of NLWVs. In order to test these hypotheses, we will consider various specific problems in the areas of communication, knowledge and agency that have their origin in perplexities or inconsistencies arising in relation to NLWVs in various contemporary debates, or in the application of new conceptual resources in these areas. The adequate treatment of these problems requires specific strategies that have as a common denominator the revision of some of the normative limits of our world view.