Upcoming Events
Abstract: Philosophical discussion of mental representation have traditionally focused on representational content: what makes a mental state represent one thing rather than another? However, a more basic question remains insufficiently explored: how do we identify the state that serve as representational vehicle in the first place?
In this talk, I examine the problem of representational-vehicle individuation using the case of Tripedalia cystophora, a box jellyfish capable of associative learning despite lacking a centralized brain. Its relatively simple nervous system provides a useful test case, since different physical structures and processes can be identified as potential representational vehicles.
I examine five strategies for individuating these vehicles: physical, functional, computational, dynamical, and teleological. By applying each strategy to the same biological system, I show that they identify different candidates and face distinct conceptual difficulties, including problems of granularity, circularity, and the distinction between computational and representational states.
I argue that identifying a representational vehicle is a distinct explanatory problem that cannot be solved by appealing to physical realization, causal role, or representational content alone. A satisfactory theory must account for multiple explanatory dimensions while providing independent criteria for vehicle identity.
Abstract:
The notion of privilege has become increasingly prevalent in recent analyses of the
marginalization of oppressed minorities. Activists urge increasing number of groups to
“check their privilege” (e.g. racial or gender privilege) and take responsibility for what
they find. For a great number of people, this process can cause unpleasant emotions
such as discomfort, guilt or shame. Thus, philosophers are devoting more and more
attention to the phenomenology and moral psychology of discomfort in these morally-
laden contexts, and a debate has emerged on whether or not discomfort can be morally
productive and, if so, how best to harness it towards social justice.
In this talk, I focus on a case that is seldom discussed in the literature: discomfort about
migration privilege. My aim is to take the first steps towards an account of the moral
emotional landscape of this ambiguous form of privilege. In other words, I seek to map
and explore the consequences of the ambivalent feelings that migrants who relocate in
comparatively advantaged financial, legal or cultural conditions experience about their
situation. I do this based on the preliminary study of three vignettes from fieldwork
among intra-EU migrants, to show that discomfort about privilege can have, at least, two
opposing consequences. On the one hand, it has the counter-productive effect of
leading privileged migrants to trying to ignore and neglecting to address their own
suffering linked to migratory grief, for example. Nonetheless, on the other, it can
increase solidarity and encourage building bridges towards less privileged migrants to
improve everyone’s conditions.
Mental Disorder and Responsiveness to Reasons
February 18th and 19th 2027
Universitat de Valencia, Valencia (Spain)
In recent years, there has been growing interest in understanding mental disorders through the lens of responsiveness to reasons. Several accounts suggest that impairments in this responsiveness may underlie various psychiatric conditions. This workshop brings together scholars working on these themes to discuss, in an accessible way, how (and whether) mental disorders restrict reason-responsiveness and what follows for rational agency, explanation, stigma, and responsibility. We invite early career scholars at any level to submit abstracts to be considered for the programme.
Key thematic questions:
- Is there a conceptual connection between mental disorders and restricted reason-responsiveness?
- How do impairments in reason-responsiveness manifest across different mental disorders?
If reason-responsiveness is restricted, does this imply a restriction of rational agency? - How might we mitigate stigma associated with disorders that appear to involve a lack of reason-responsiveness?
- What causal relationship might a lack of reason-responsiveness have to the pathology of mental disorder?
- What implications does restricted reason-responsiveness have for free will, and moral and legal responsibility?
- Do mental disorders challenge the idea that rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental?
- Are (at least some) mental disorders (at least partially) amenable to rational explanation?
Those wishing to apply should submit a blinded abstract (300-350 words) to
mddrvalencia@outlook.com.
The deadline for abstract submission is June 17th 2026. Successful applicants will be notified by the end of August. Do feel free to contact us if you have any questions/inquiries regarding submission.
Confirmed speakers:
Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)
Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)
Sanja Dembić (Humboldt University of Berlin)
Carolina Flores (University of Lisbon)
Juliette Vazard (University of Zurich)
Sophie Keeling (UNED, Madrid)
Organisers:
Aida Roige (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Fabian Hundertmark (Universitat de València)
Ed Armitage (Aarhus University)
