Christopher Hookway In Memoriam
Christopher Hookway, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, died on 21 October 2024 after a long illness. Prior to taking up a chair at Sheffield, he held it at Birmingham, where he taught from 1977 to 1995. His death has deeply moved many people who had personal contact with him, friends, disciples, colleagues, but has also been felt with grief by others who simply knew him through his publications and scholarly activity. The sad news of his death has had a special effect on many professors and former students of the former Department of Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge of the University of Valencia, now integrated, as a teaching unit of the same title, in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Valencia. The authors of this obituary belong to this group. We had, over many years, a close relationship with him, which included, in addition to the intellectual and philosophical facet, an intimate bond of friendship and affection. We have therefore been particularly saddened by the loss of this kind, intelligent, generous, warm-hearted and humorous person, Chris Hookway.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Department of Philosophy at the Universitat de València would not have the spirit and quality it now has without Chris’s influence, especially through his activity as tutor, in Birmingham and later in Sheffield, of several of those who were or are lecturers in the Department. Throughout his life, Chris always worked within the framework of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, and his influence on our Department has naturally had this imprint. In addition to the undersigned, other Valencian philosophers, such as Josep Corbí, José Miguel Esteban, David Carnicer and Sergi Rosell, also enjoyed his invaluable intellectual fellowship and tutelage. This broad and extensive collaboration with Valencian academic philosophy, and his invaluable contribution to the quality of teaching and research in the Philosophy degree, led to Professor Hookway being awarded the Gold Medal of the Faculty of Philosophy and Education. The granting of this award was promoted by several professors of the Faculty, friends and disciples of Chris, gladly accepted by the academic authorities and managed in particular by Tobies Grimaltos, co-author of this obituary. This distinction was a sincere expression, on an institutional level, of the deep gratitude felt by his friends and disciples towards Professor Christopher Hookway.
Hookway was a recognised specialist in American pragmatism. His interest in this philosophical current, and especially in the work of Charles S. Peirce, was what, with a Fullbright scholarship, led him to devote, in the 1980s, an academic course at Harvard University, studying the work of this author. In 1985 he published Peirce, the first of an important series of publications on pragmatism. In fact, this current largely shaped his work and his way of doing and conceiving philosophy. A way of philosophising, however, that did not allow itself to be constrained either by fashions or by styles. Hookway’s work has always oozed freedom of thought, originality and rigour. His books on Quine (Quine, 1988), mainly, and on scepticism (Scepticism, 1990) were milestones in his career and brought him international recognition. The book on Quine constituted a clear light in the understanding of the American philosopher’s work. So valuable was the book in this respect that it merited a letter from the author himself in which he praised and discussed Hookway’s interpretations of various aspects of Quine’s work. In this letter, a sincere Quine, who sometimes complains that certain ideas or views are attributed to him, also says things like this: ‘I read Part I with delight and admiration; I delight in your grasp and appreciation of my views, and admiration for your lucid exposition’. As for Quine’s disagreements with Hookway, Putnam, upon learning of the letter in 2014, published a text entitled ‘Hookway and Quine’ (2015) in which he stated: ‘[I]n the letter Ouine does not challenge Hookway’s interpretation. Rather, he denies, on different grounds, that this interpretation applies to him. Not only is this disingenious, but it suggests that it was not so much Hookway that Quine was trying to convince, but himself.’
On 21 October, not only did a good philosopher die, as these lines prove, but also a great person, to whom the Department of Philosophy of the University of Valencia owes a priceless debt.
Tobies Grimaltos, Carlos Moya and Jordi Valor