Basic information
The RG discusses papers on mechanisms, scientific evidence, and the intersection of both topics. The RG will meet online every other Friday (12:00-14:00).
Potential readings
- Bechtel, W. (2015). Can mechanistic explanation be reconciled with scale-free constitution and dynamics?. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 53, 84-93.
- Cairney, P. (2016). The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy Making. Chapter 2, ‘The Role of Evidence in Theories of the Policy Process’, pp. 13-50. Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51781-4_2
- Hochstein, E. (2016). One mechanism, many models: A distributed theory of mechanistic explanation. Synthese, 193(5), 1387-1407.
- Cartwright, N. (2021). Rigour versus the Need for Evidential Diversity. Synthese, 199: 13095-13119. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03368-1
- Kuorikoski, J., & Marchionni, C. (2022). Mixed Method Research and Variety of Evidence in Political Science (pp. 266-280). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science.
- Larroulet Philippi, C. (2022). There Is Cause to Randomize. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 152-170.
- Stegenga, J. (2022). Evidence of Effectiveness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 91: 288-295. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.01.001
- Shan, Y., & Williamson, J. (2023). Evidential pluralism in the social sciences (p. 191). Taylor & Francis.
- Kuorikoski, J. (2024). Contrastive Evidence and Inductive Risk. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75(1): 61-76. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/715183
- Reijula, S. and Blanco Sequeiros, S. (forthcoming). Persistant Evidential Discordance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23568/1/reijula_and_blanco_sequeiros2024.pdf
Coordinators
Losner Briones and Saúl Pérez-González
Contact
losner.briones@fsof.uned.es / saul.perez@uv.es
Funding
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation [PID2021-125936NB-I00]