Exceptionalism vs Anti-exceptionalism in Logic

Reading Group on the Epistemology, Methodology, and Normativity of Logic

Modality: In-person meetings every two weeks, on Tuesdays from 11:00–13:00 hrs or Wednesdays from 10:00–12:00 hrs (final schedule to be confirmed).

Start date: 3 November 2026.

Contact: Jordi Valor (jordi.valor@uv.es).

This academic year, the reading group Exceptionalism vs Anti-exceptionalism in Logic will explore contemporary philosophical debates concerning the distinctive status of logic and its relationship to other sciences.

The group will address whether the epistemological methods and subject matter of logic are exceptional in comparison with those of the natural sciences, or whether there is no sharp distinction between logic and other scientific disciplines. Particular attention will be devoted to the question of whether logic is normative in a sense in which other sciences are not.

Through a selection of contemporary philosophical texts, participants will examine competing approaches to logical methodology, the justification of logical principles, the role of evidence in logical theory, and the relationship between logic and normativity.

Reading programme:

  • Session 1 — 3 November 2026: Martin & Hjortland (2024).
  • Session 2: Martin & Hjortland (2025).
  • Session 3: Field (2009) and Harman (2009).
  • Session 4: Priest (2016).
  • Session 5: Russell (2015).
  • Session 6: Hjortland (2017).
  • Session 7: Hjortland (2019).
  • Session 8: Russell (2020).

Reading list:

  1. Field, Hartry (2009). “The Normative Role of Logic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 83, 251–268. DOI · PDF.
  2. Harman, Gilbert (2009). “Field on the Normative Role of Logic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109(3), 333–335. DOI.
  3. Hjortland, Ole T. (2017). “Anti-exceptionalism about Logic.” Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 631–658. DOI.
  4. Hjortland, Ole Thomassen (2019). “What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?” The Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 250–282. DOI.
  5. Martin, B., and Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2024). “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti-Exceptionalism.” Philosophy Compass, e13014. DOI.
  6. Martin, B., and Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2025). “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): Methodological Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.” Philosophy Compass, 20, e70018. DOI.
  7. Priest, Graham (2016). “Logical Disputes and the A Priori.” Logique et Analyse, 236, 347–366. DOI · JSTOR.
  8. Russell, Gillian (2015). “The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44(6), 793–803. DOI.
  9. Russell, Gillian (2020). “Logic Isn’t Normative.” Inquiry, 63(3–4), 371–388. DOI.
  10. Russell, Gillian (2024). “From Anti-Exceptionalism to Feminist Logic.” Hypatia, 39, 79–96. DOI.

Funding & Research Projects

Normative Limits of Our World View (PID2023-151071NB-I00), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ and FEDER (A Way of Making Europe, EU).