Indexicals and de se thoughts

On the second semester of academic year 2019-20, we will meet on Wednesdays from 5pm to 6.30pm to comment various philosophical texts on the problem of indexicals and de se thought. Meetings will be held at Seminar Room in the 7th floor of the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences . 

Schedule

5 Feb: García-Carpintero, M. & Torres, S. (2016) About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press.

12 Feb: García-Carpintero, M. & Torres, S. (2016) About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, Oxford University Press.

19 Feb: Morgan, D. & Salje, L. (2020), First-Person Thought, Analysis, 80:1, 148–163.

26 Feb: O’Brien, L. (2012) “Ordinary self-consciousness” in J. Liu and J. Perry Consciousness and the Self, Cambridge University Press.

4 Mar: De Vignemont, F. (2017) “Agency and Bodily Ownership: The Bodyguard Hypothesis” in F. de Vignemont and A. Alsmith The subject’s matter, The MIT Press.

11 Mar

25 Mar

1 Apr

Texts

García-Carpintero, M. & Torres, S. (2016) About Oneself: De SeThought and Communication, Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, R. (1981) Indexical Belief, Synthese, 49:1, 129-151.

Perry, J. (1979) The Problem of the Essential Indexical,  Noûs, 13: 3–21.

Lewis, D. (1979) Attitudes De Dicto and De SePhilosophical Review, 88: 513–43.

Santorio, P. (2012) Reference and Monstrosity, Philosophical Review 121:3

Ninan, D. (2010) De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication, Philosophy Compass 5(7): 551-567

Morgan, D. & Salje, L. (2020), First-Person Thought, Analysis, 80:1, 148–163.

O’Brien, L. (2012) “Ordinary self-consciousness” in J. Liu and J. Perry Consciousness and the Self, Cambridge University Press.

De Vignemont, F. (2017) “Agency and Bodily Ownership: The Bodyguard Hypothesis” in F. de Vignemont and A. Alsmith The subject’s matter, The MIT Press.

Contact
Marta.Cabrera@uv.es