Nir Fresco – Miscomputation as a Type of Malfunction

WHEN: 10 May, 2024 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm

Abstract: When representation fails, it results in misrepresentation; likewise, faulty computation leads to miscomputation. Theories of representation that also explain misrepresentation are abundant. By contrast, theories of computation, we will argue, do not likewise explain miscomputation. Despite its significance for understanding physical computation and its theoretical role in explaining abnormal mental phenomena, surprisingly few works have characterised miscomputation explicitly (e.g., Colombo, 2021; Fresco & Primiero, 2013; Piccinini, 2015; Tucker, 2018). When miscomputation occurs, a system computes a different mathematical function, g, rather than the normal function, f (i.e., there exists at least one input ix such that g(ix) ≠ f(ix)). Normative accounts of computation, whether semantic or mechanistic, face a dilemma: either there is no such thing as miscomputation, or it cannot be explained. A key contentious claim here though is that miscomputation, unlike standard malfunction, is a form of computation. A system that does not compute cannot miscompute (Tucker, 2018). In this talk, we will outline the dilemma, defend the preceding contentious claim, and propose a potential initial solution.