What is the phenomenology of agency? That is, what is the experience of acting? Or: what is it like to act? There are various ways of addressing these questions. (A) One is to try to introspect as one is acting in an attempt to be something of a connoisseur of the experiences of acting. This is perhaps the traditional philosophical method (throughout the history of philosophy, but culminating in phenomenology) and it was also employed at the inception of Psychology, within the introspectionist tradition, where subjects were trained in introspection and introspective report (Wundt, Titchener; Csikszentmihalyi on ‘flow experience, Marcel). (B) Another is an extension of the introspective approach, by trying to get larger numbers of subjects to report their experiences of acting under experimental conditions, so as to find general patterns in experience that do not rely on connoisseurship on the part of individual subjects. There are modern ways of conducting these surveys involving principal component analysis and other sophisticated statistical methods (e.g. Longo et al.’s 2008 Cognition paper on the phenomenology of the sense of body ownership). (C) Yet another method involves operationalising the phenomenology of acting and conducting experiments, so that using these implicit measures, we can both try to correlate explicit reports on the experience of acting (using questionnaires) with the implicit measures, so that we can (i) infer the content of experiences of acting, (ii) infer what the processes are computing over and (iii) the mechanisms underlying them (e.g. the intentional binding paradigm from Haggard and others etc.). Another recent extension of this third line of investigation is the use of non-report, decoding paradigms, to decode the content of certain activities, in this case, experiences of acting. This is not an uncontroversial claim, but in traditional philosophical parlance, we might say that these are ‘observational’ ways to get at the experience of acting.
There is an older tradition in the philosophy of action that approaches the question of experiences of acting differently, from what we might call a ‘non-observational’ or agentive angle (Aquinas, Vico, Hegel, Anscombe, O’Shaughnessy, Moran, etc.). Here the approach is not so much a posteriori as a priori. Sometimes it will seem as if the approach is a version of approach (A) above, but when push comes to shove, the claims are underpinned more by a priori justifications than by success in fitting or explaining the introspective ‘data’ (Anscombe and followers, such as Ford, Rödl, Thompson, Vogler). Within this latter tradition, the master question relates to agent’s knowledge: what is the distinctive knowledge that an agent has in
acting?
The clash of the conceptions of agency and its phenomenology presented by these two traditions demand that we ask what the relation between agency and self-awareness is. Does agency normatively require self-awareness as orthodox philosophical accounts have claimed? Or does it not, as more cognitive scientifically-inspired accounts have claimed based on various dissociations observed? Is there a way to find a middle way that captures the insights from both sides? And, crucially, how does the epistemology of agency relate to its phenomenology?
My aim in this talk is partly comparative and partly integrative. I will try to bring these two traditions together, by setting forth the basic ideas of each approach and indicating points of disagreement and agreement. Getting clear on the conceptual lay of the land here is vital to understanding how each tradition can contribute to our understanding of control, habit, motor cognition, the phenomenology of agency, perceptual guidance, and skill – and to gauge whether a reconciliation of the two traditions is at all possible.
