Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that the inclusion of simple expressive actions, such as jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame, in Rosalind Hursthouse’s famous list of arrational actions should be revised. I will argue that Peter Goldie’s intuition that such cases might not really be actions was on the right track, although I will defend that this idea needs some qualification. By comparing simple expressive actions with genuine facial expressions of emotion, which we do not consider actions, I will show that there are no significant differences between the two. Many authors have thought voluntariness to be the criterion that grounds our considering simple expressive actions to be actions (jumping for joy) and genuine facial expressions of emotions not to be so (smiling out of joy) (Goldie 2000, Betzler 2007a, Bennett 2016, Müller and Wong 2019). I will argue that voluntariness, understood in different ways, does not provide us with such a criterion and will explore other possible significant differences between the two cases at issue (Betzler 2007b, Pineda 2019). The conclusion of my analyses will be that we cannot reasonably hold that simple expressive actions are actions while also holding that genuine facial expressions of emotion are not.
