Colloquium: Michael Kremer (University of Chicago): Gilbert Ryle’s Fregean Inheritance

When:
3 December, 2021 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
2021-12-03T11:30:00+01:00
2021-12-03T13:30:00+01:00

Gilbert Ryle is famous for introducing into philosophy the critical term “category mistake,” which plays a central role in The Concept of Mind. Yet in his later Dilemmas, he downplays the importance of talk of categories in philosophical argument. Anthony Palmer has argued (a) that Ryle’s philosophical methodology is inspired by Frege but (b) the idea of category-mistakes is in tension with Frege’s famous context principle. I argue in contrast that (a) Ryle’s methodology initially derived not from Frege but from Russell and Husserl, (b) Ryle’s understanding of Frege developed and deepened over his career, and led to his distancing himself from the method of philosophical criticism centered on categories, but (c) Ryle’s acceptance of the full consequences of Frege’s context principle was hampered by his failure to properly appreciate Wittgenstein’s distinction between sign and symbol in the Tractatus.