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Essentialism about kinds arguably trivializes: kinds generally have essences—properties that determine kind membership. Furthermore, kind essentialism can indeed be dissociated from some of the pernicious claims responsible for its bad reputation among feminist philosophers, as it is compatible with the debunking emancipatory effects of showing the socially constructed and changeable character of many aspects of gender. That being said, there is something congenial with rejecting (kind) essentialism about gender: submitting specific substantive accounts of what it is to be a woman—that is, pairing specific kinds with significant expressions like ‘woman’—has unduly exclusionary effects produced by lack of appropriate engagement and sensitivity to intersectional layers of oppression, and to the struggles of particularly marginalized groups. The appropriate response to these effects is to reject the view that there is one specific kind of woman—by abstaining from any such pairings. At the end of the paper, I consider, somehow more tentatively, how the main negative lessons are compatible with general as well as perhaps local, contextual, flexible negotiations and eventual decisions, whenever they are required or fruitful—revealing the true—but not mere—terminological character of the normative issues under consideration.
