Vincenzo Crupi – The case of early Copernicanism: Epistemic luck, predictivism, and the scientific method

When:
22 March, 2024 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
2024-03-22T11:30:00+01:00
2024-03-22T13:30:00+01:00

Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin): The case of early Copernicanism: Epistemic luck, predictivism, and the scientific method

From Copernicus himself up to Kepler and Galilei, Copernicans have been “right for the wrong reasons” (Finocchiaro 2010), because there were no epistemically compelling reasons objectively favoring the Copernican position at that stage – a good deal of research in the history and philosophy of science has converged on this claim. The situation of early Copernicans would then be regarded as one of “epistemic luck”. Imre Lakatos and Elie Zahar (1975) have featured in one relatively rare contemporary episode of sustained opposition to the epistemic luck thesis about early Copernicanism. Although known and appreciated in certain philosophical circles, it is fair to say that Lakatos and Zahar’s predictivist vindication has remained quite unsuccessful. The goal of this contribution is to revive it in updated form. My analysis will support some general claims. First and foremost, previous limitations of a predictivist account of the Copernican controversy can be amended to counter the epistemic luck thesis. Second, consideration of the vindication thesis highlights certain important but neglected elements of the historical narrative. Finally, this new rational reconstruction of the “cold case” of the Copernican revolution raises a challenge to the once controversial but now popular philosophical view that “there is no orverarching scientific method of any substance” (Kitcher 2023).