Víctor Verdejo (Universitat de València): Perspectives on the Bodily Self

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When:
4 October, 2019 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
2019-10-04T11:30:00+02:00
2019-10-04T13:30:00+02:00
Where:
Seminari de Filosofia
Av. de Blasco Ibáñez
30, 46010 València, Valencia
Spain

Abstract: According to some recent developments, subjects may express the same thought with co-referential uses of ‘I am F’ and ‘You are/He is F’. They can do so, these developments suggest, by recourse to distinct perspectives or ways of thinking of a self, i.e., the first person and the second/third person perspective. But do these perspectives also feature in the analysis of the bodily self? In this paper, I explore an affirmative answer to this question in terms of types of body representation in action. In particular, I argue, deafferented subjects (subjects who have no proprioception in large parts of their bodies) show how distinct perspectives can be rooted in different but interconnected types of body representation. In ordinary non-deafferented physical action, the basic idea goes, one’s body is accessed first-personally or ‘from the inside’ whereas deafferented subjects act with their body third-personally or ‘like remote control’. This idea also fits nicely with the view that body representation can be classified as involving first or third personal perspectives depending on its source.