2nd Prague-Valencia Workshop on Analytic Philosophy

When:
15 February, 2024 – 16 February, 2024 all-day
2024-02-15T00:00:00+01:00
2024-02-17T00:00:00+01:00
Where:
Facultat de Filosofia i Ciències de l'Educació
Av Blasco Ibáñez
30
València (46010)

2nd PRAGUE-VALENCIA WORKSHOP ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

February, 15th-16th 2024

 

PROGRAMME

You can download it here

 

TALKS & ABSTRACTS

Jakub Mihálik (CAS): Consciousness & the Meta-Problem of Acquaintance

Abstract: According to a widespread intuition, in having a conscious experience, one is ipso facto acquainted with this experience (Chalmers, Goff, Prinz, Giustina), for example, with what it’s like to taste a mango. Such ‘acquaintance intuitions’ portray acquaintance as the subject’s direct, intimate awareness of their experiences, something that’s hard to account for in physicalist terms, hence yielding ‘the problem of acquaintance’ (Levine, Kriegel, Balog). I’ll examine how our acquaintance intuitions, i.e. our judgments and reports about acquaintance, arise. Since this is, at least in part, the problem of accounting for why we judge that there is a problem of acquaintance, I’ll call it, inspired by Chalmers, the meta-problem of acquaintance. As I’ll explain, addressing this problem is crucial for both realists about consciousness, who typically invoke acquaintance when accounting for our special, epistemically secure, awareness of experience, and for illusionists, who often allow that we have a (misleading) sense of acquaintance. I’ll argue that Chalmers’ tentative solution to the meta-problem of acquaintance, inspired by Saad’s views, relies on acquaintance being phenomenally present, as part of one’s conscious experience, which, I’ll argue, is implausible. I will then outline two approaches available to those who view acquaintance as (often) non-phenomenal: The ‘awareness schema approach’, inspired by Graziano, and the ‘inferential approach’, inspired by Rosenthal and Coleman. I’ll conclude by explaining why the latter approach is preferable for realists about consciousness.

Comments: Matheus Valente (UV)

 

Anna Giustina (UV): Moods as Ways of Inner Awareness

Abstract: The philosophical debate around the nature of moods has mostly focused on their apparent undirectedness: unlike mental states such as perceptual experiences, thoughts, and emotions, moods do not seem to be directed at any specific object, and indeed they do not seem to be directed at anything at all. In this paper, I want to draw attention to a different feature of moods, one that is as important and in need of explanation as their apparent undirectedness, but which has been overlooked by most participants in the debate: the fact that moods involve a particularly marked salience of the subjective aspect of experience. I argue that any adequate theory of moods should account for this fact. I call this the “subjective salience desideratum.” In the bulk of the paper, I articulate and motivate the desideratum, show that extant theories of moods do not satisfy it, and offer a preliminary overview of possible (yet unexplored) theories that have the subjective salience desideratum at their core.

Comments:Tomáš Marvan (CAS)

 

Pavel Janda (CAS): Why Is Using Ratio Judgments and Aggregating Them by the Weighted Geometric Mean Advantageous?

Abstract: The question about the best method of aggregating judgements (such as preferences or beliefs) is important for both multi-criteria decision  theory and epistemology. I aim to show that one should aggregate ratio judgements (for example, odds instead of absolute probabilities) and aggregate them by the weighted geometric mean. I will argue that this  method satisfies the highest number of desirable axioms without reaching  impossibility results. My argument combines decision-theoretic and  epistemic approaches.

Comments: Valeriano Iranzo (UV)

 

Juraj Hvorecký (CAS): Epistemology and ethics of deep learning intertwined

Abstract: Blame for various missteps of deep networks is often assigned to either programmers or users. The discovery adversarial attacks and the complex epistemology behind supervised neural networks leads us to skepticism toward their capacity to work efficiently in domains where robust human categories are central. Will will illustrate how end-to-end optimization that networks are trained to achieve contravene the employment of human categorization when atetmpting to understand networks’ inner operations. As ethics is one important domain where various humanly robust categories are central, deep networks might be particularly unsuitable for replacement of various operations in this domain.

Comments: Marc Artiga (UV)

 

Manuel Almagro (UV): Authority, manipulation, and the descriptive/evaluative distinction.

Abstract: In my presentation, I will explore different situations where seemingly descriptive speech is actually covertly evaluative –and vice versa–, and discuss how this phenomenon is sometimes exploited for manipulation. The aim will be to delve into the normativity of language concerning the descriptive/evaluative distinction.

Comments: Jose Luis Guerrero Quiñones (CAS)

 

Tomáš Koblížek (CAS): Semi-Anonymous Hate Speech

Abstract: The presentation will deal with a widespread type of hate speech that has not yet been investigated in the  applied philosophy of language focusing on hateful expressions:  semi-anonymous hate speech, which includes an irreducible element of  anonymity and non-anonymity. Two types of hate speech are typically distinguished – anonymous speech, whose authors are not identifiable as particular individuals, and non-anonymous speech, whose authors are  identifiable as such. I explain that such a distinction does not capture utterances whose author is identifiable, yet does not merely use the utterance in question, but also approvingly mentions  an indeterminate mass of previously formulated hateful utterances. This introduces a crucial element of anonymity into the originally non-anonymous utterance and allows us to talk about semi-anonymous hate  speech. I will focus on the following three points: (i) this kind of  mention is not just a mention of some other utterance, but of a mass of  hateful utterances; (ii) the echo here may be an expression not only of  agreement with a proposition, but also with the use of derogatory  language and offensive illocution; (iii) semi-anonymous hate speech is  an expression of consent to a certain type of authority that may  underlie the mass of hateful statements.

Comments: Josep Corbí (UV)

 

Valentí Simpson (UV): Communication in the face of mismatch: Triangulating on Similar Content

Accounts of successful communication have traditionally taken it to involve an identity of subject’s mental contents as a result of interaction. However, subjects seem to be able to communicate successfully in the face of mismatches of contents or cognitive perspectives, which seems to call into question the content-identity story as it is traditionally told; I call this the mismatch problem. As a result of this problem, some have developed accounts of communication that do away with content completely, instead relying on other notions and frameworks to take content’s explanatory role; I call these content-neglecting views. In this paper, I look at a recent development of this family. I discuss Alexander Sandgren’s (2019, 2021, 2023) autonomist view of content and his triangulation theory of “aboutness”, which together form his content-neglecting view of communication, and ultimately reject his position for a couple of reasons. I then propose my own account of communication, which takes resources from Sandgren’s triangulation story to build a content-involving framework that explains communicative success, not as necessitating content identity, but instead some level of content similarity. 

Comments: Vít Gvoždiak (CAS)

 

Virginia Ballesteros (UV): Standardized knowledge and epistemic injustice in psychiatry

Abstract: Recent literature has showed that engaging with patients’ perspectives, narratives, and lived experiences is a necessary condition for epistemic justice in psychiatry. I subscribe to this view and, accordingly, examine how the conception of objectivity in psychiatry may be an obstacle to this. I argue that the high value placed on objectivity in psychiatry is a full-fledged theoretical commitment, and that objectivity has been conceived of in terms of the reliability provided by standardized instruments of assessment and diagnosis. I introduce the classic distinction between the nomothetic method and the idiographic approach, and argue that privileging the nomothetic method in clinical practice promotes epistemic injustice. I conclude that rethinking the value or the conception of objectivity beyond standardization in clinical practice is necessary to achieve epistemic justice.

Comments: Martin Zach (CAS)

 

Pavel Arazim (CAS): Rules in motion: rule-following with Bergson and Wittgenstein

Bergson and Wittgenstein both like to stress that philosophical questions should disappear once we clarify them.Even if Wittgenstein is much more categorical and apodictic about this, the similarity prevails so much that it deserves closer attention.

Bergson begins his philosophical work by an attempt to dissolve the problem of liberty and proceeds to doing the same with, among others, Zeno´s paradoxes, the source of the morality, nothingness or evil. After trying to solve as many as all philosohical problems in one fell swoop in the Tractatus, later Wittgenstein works much more piecemeal, but we can highlight the question of rule-following and sceptical doubts about reality as examples of dissolutions he attemtpted at later.

Rule following, a topic particularly dear to the Wittgenstein scholars, displays a striking analogy with Zeno´s paradoxes. While Achilles seems unable to catch up with the tortoise, as he has to go through infinitely many points in order to get on her level, the aspiring rule-follower of the Philosophical Investigations is in a similarly troubling situation. In order to follow a rule, it seems, she has to interpreted it, which ivolves fencing off all the wrong interpretations. Yet there seems to be no limit to them and therefore, no rule-following can ever be achieved. Or, if the subject does something, then  her deed can be seen as in accordance with many other rules. All the determinacy seems to evaporate.

While it might seem that we need to add something in order to disambiguate and escape all the indeterminacy, Wittgenstein mentions all such disambiguations because he wants to show their insufficiency. How do we follow rules and how do we move? In both cases, it seems we have to do with quite a mundane phenomenon which resists theoretical explication.

In both cases, the answer consists in the dissolution of the question by showing that it is replete with untenable presuppositions. For Bergson, this boils down to the reduction of movement to its stages, while for Wittgenstein it boils down to excessively intellectualist accounts of rules. While it is tempting to see rules as a kind of railway going into infinity and determing of every action whether it is in accordance with it or not, Wittgenstein mentions the possibility of rules being determined only in the course of their application.

This approach to rules sees them as much more dynamic and could even be linked to Bergson´s conception of the normative in the Two sources. Bergson stresses that we also follow rules blindly and not only sometimes, but typically. But, unlike Wittgenstein, he distinguishes two kinds of this following, corresponding to his two sources. We can either follow a rule under the dictate of a societal pressure or we can follow it inspired by a creative enthusiasm. This distinction enables us to flesh out in more detail the sketchy but crucial mention of the notion of the form of life in Investigations. Forms of life enable both the requisite specificity but also the further development into new shapes.

Comments: Jordi Valor (UV)

 

Víctor Verdejo (UPF): Seeing and knowing what I do.

Abstract: Elizabeth Anscombe famously held that knowledge of one’s own actions is in an important sense ‘knowledge without observation’. Following her lead, many philosophers take the non-observational character of this form of self-knowledge to be one of its elementary features. My goal in this paper is to critically discuss the role of observation in self-knowledge of action in the light of theoretical treatments as well as reflection on psychological data. These considerations suggest that self-knowledge of intentional bodily action can be reached in possibly observational ways, and is hence in a sense accessible to others. The puzzle this possibility might generate dissipates, I shall propose, if we exploit the theoretical resources attached to the idea that knowledge – and self-knowledge of action in particular – can be attained in various ways.

Comments: Tomáš Hříbek (CAS)

 

SPONSORED BY THE RESEARCH PROJECTS:

Eliminativism, Fictionalism, and Expressivism. The possibility of a negative metaphysical verdict about a discourse D. (Reference: PID2019-106420GA-I00). Funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033.

The Representational Penumbra – an investigation of borderline cases of representation. (Reference: PID2021-127046NA-I00). Funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033.

The Epistemology of Responsibility in Agency-Stultifying Situations. (Reference: PID2022-139226NB-I00). Funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación. MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033.

Deceptive Representations (Reference: CISEJI/2023/51). Funded by the Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria d’Educació, Universitats i Ocupació.

 

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