Christian Carbonell – Ignorance in Intentional and Voluntary Actions

When:
2 February, 2024 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
2024-02-02T11:30:00+01:00
2024-02-02T13:30:00+01:00

Christian Carbonell (Universitat de València)

Abstract: Many action theorists claim that voluntary action is undermined by ignorance and coercion. And many have it that intentional action is undermined by ignorance but not necessarily by coercion. In view of this, some have defended that acting intentionally is not identical to nor involves acting voluntarily. For an action done under coercion could be intentional but not voluntary. In this presentation, I ask whether the same applies to ignorance —an action done out of ignorance, could it be intentional but not voluntary? I say yes. I motivate an epistemic condition about deceitful manipulation and argue that a failure to meet it could undermine the voluntary character of an action without undermining its intentionality. This is roughly because voluntariness is relevantly connected to autonomy in a way intentionality is not.