Abstract:
Modern philosophy has always looked at partiality with suspicion, regarding morality, but also knowledge, at least the kind of knowledge that has deserved most attention in epistemology since Descartes’ refoundation of the discipline. Knowledge has been taken to be impartial, capable of being appreciated regardless of the perspective that the subject occupies.
There is nothing more partial than love, the kind of love one feels for their children, for their friends… for their lovers. This is the love whose role regarding knowledge we will explore in this talk, not the love to humanity or to ideals or to knowledge itself… Does liking a person, loving a person, feeling comradery towards a person necessarily clouds our judgement, be it our ethical judgement or the epistemic practices that lead us to the acquisition of beliefs?
I will argue that, although it obviously does sometimes, it often plays the opposite role: some forms of knowledge, some of them cognitively and politically crucial for us, demand an emotional, perspective-dependent engagement with reality. My starting point will be the suggestion that attention to the particular should guide not only love’s labour but also the education of our ethical and epistemic sensibilities.
