Christian Carbonell (University of Valencia): Intentional action, knowledge, and the dynamics of control

Abstract:

A longstanding tradition in action theory posits a close connection between intentional action and knowledge. On this view, what distinguishes intentional actions from unintentional ones is that the former involve knowledge, whereas the latter do not. This paper revisits that tradition through the lens of control. The guiding thought is that when someone acts intentionally, their success is not a matter of accident, luck, or coincidence. This is often attributed to the fact that their action is necessarily under their control. But what exactly about control ensures this non-accidentality? I compare two epistemic proposals: one that ties control to practical knowledge—i.e., knowledge that one is ϕ-ing while one is ϕ-ing—and another that ties it to know-how. While some have recently endorsed both views, others have gone as far as to deny that control bears any substantive connection to knowledge of any kind. I argue for a middle ground and defend the know-how approach as the more promising account. Not only does it accommodate the full range of intentional actions, but it also captures key dynamics of control. In particular, I argue that it helps elucidate the kind of intelligent flexibility that is distinctive of controlled actions.