Abstract: Philosophical discussion of mental representation have traditionally focused on representational content: what makes a mental state represent one thing rather than another? However, a more basic question remains insufficiently explored: how do we identify the state that serve as representational vehicle in the first place?
In this talk, I examine the problem of representational-vehicle individuation using the case of Tripedalia cystophora, a box jellyfish capable of associative learning despite lacking a centralized brain. Its relatively simple nervous system provides a useful test case, since different physical structures and processes can be identified as potential representational vehicles.
I examine five strategies for individuating these vehicles: physical, functional, computational, dynamical, and teleological. By applying each strategy to the same biological system, I show that they identify different candidates and face distinct conceptual difficulties, including problems of granularity, circularity, and the distinction between computational and representational states.
I argue that identifying a representational vehicle is a distinct explanatory problem that cannot be solved by appealing to physical realization, causal role, or representational content alone. A satisfactory theory must account for multiple explanatory dimensions while providing independent criteria for vehicle identity.
