Samuel Boardman (Technische Universität Dresden): The Role of Emotional Intelligence in Modal Cognition (Colloquium)

When:
17 October, 2025 @ 12:30 pm – 1:45 pm
2025-10-17T12:30:00+02:00
2025-10-17T13:45:00+02:00

Abstract

Adequate modal epistemologies ought to give an account of adult modal cognition that can integrate with a plausible account of children’s modal cognition and its development. Results in cognitive science have shown that young children are subject to a “modal pessimism bias”, judging fewer events possible than are in fact possible (e.g., Shtulman and Carey 2007). Younger children judge improbable events (e.g., drinking onion juice), immoral events (e.g., stealing chocolate), and unconventional events (e.g., wearing pyjamas to school) as impossible. Psychologists suggest that this is due to deficiencies in children’s imagination: children don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow these events to happen. As I am going to show, this is a version of the counterfactual imagination approach that leverages the equivalence ‘p is possible iff there exists some q such that if q were the case, p might be the case’ (Williamson 2007; Kroedel 2012). However, recent results have shown that children are subject to a “moral puritanism bias”, judging impossible, improbable, and unconventional events immoral (e.g., Shtulman and Phillips 2018). But it is neither plausible that children judge an event immoral if they don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow these events to happen; nor that children don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow immoral or unconventional events to happen.

My emotion-based approach suggests that children use coarse-grain feelings of violation of expectation to make their modal and moral judgements. The events which children judge impossible and immoral violate principles or regularities which children are sensitive to. As developmental psychologists put it, these events violate children’s “expectations”. Given their low emotional intelligence, children cannot make fine-grain affective distinctions between feelings of violation of physical principles (astonishment), violation of empirical regularities (surprise), and violation of moral principles (shock). This emotion-based approach therefore provides a unifying explanation of children’s biases in terms of their more general deficit in emotional differentiation. Given important continuities between children’s and adults’ modal cognition, we have reason to think that affective experience plays an important role in adults’ intuitive modal cognition too. The emotion-based approach is therefore an important alternative to the hitherto dominant imagination-based approach.