Abstract
Adequate modal epistemologies ought to give an account of adult modal cognition that can integrate with a plausible account of children’s modal cognition and its development. Results in cognitive science have shown that young children are subject to a “modal pessimism bias”, judging fewer events possible than are in fact possible (e.g., Shtulman and Carey 2007). Younger children judge improbable events (e.g., drinking onion juice), immoral events (e.g., stealing chocolate), and unconventional events (e.g., wearing pyjamas to school) as impossible. Psychologists suggest that this is due to deficiencies in children’s imagination: children don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow these events to happen. As I am going to show, this is a version of the counterfactual imagination approach that leverages the equivalence ‘p is possible iff there exists some q such that if q were the case, p might be the case’ (Williamson 2007; Kroedel 2012). However, recent results have shown that children are subject to a “moral puritanism bias”, judging impossible, improbable, and unconventional events immoral (e.g., Shtulman and Phillips 2018). But it is neither plausible that children judge an event immoral if they don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow these events to happen; nor that children don’t manage to imagine circumstances that would allow immoral or unconventional events to happen.
