Speakers
Chirstopher Bennett, University of Sheffield
Josep Corbí, University of Valencia
Miguel Gramage, University of Valencia
Xue (Snow) Li, UNSW Sydney & Kobe University
Ryan Manhire, Abo Akademi University
Takuya Niikawa, Kobe University
Moritz Pretzsch, University of Kassel/University of Munich
Mercedes Rivero, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid
Álvaro Rodríguez González, University of Sheffield
PROGRAMME
| Thursday 12 | |
| 9.00 | Opening
Chair: Sergi Rosell |
| 9.15-10.30 | Christopher Bennett (University of Sheffield)
Is Secondary Liability Unjust, Corrupting or Superfluous? |
| Coffee Break | |
| 11.00-12.15 | Mercedes Rivero (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid)
Misunderstanding in Action: The Gap Between Intelligibility and Meaning-Making |
| 12.20-13.35 | Miguel Gramage (University of Valencia)
Structures, Agency, and Perception: A Gibsonian Account of Perceptual Practices |
| Lunch
Chair: Jesús Vega |
|
| 16.00-17.15 | Álvaro Rodríguez González (University of Sheffield)
Insensitivity to Animals, Insensitivity to Responsibility: A Kantian Argument |
| 17.30-18.45 | Moritz Pretzsch (University of Kassel/University of Munich)
How should we think about self-deception? – A suggestion. |
| Friday 13
Chair: Chon Tejedor |
|
| 9.15-10.30 | Ryan Manhire (Abo Akademi University)
Individual Responsibility and the Danger of Self-Deception in Responses to Climate Change |
| Coffee Break | |
| 11.00-12.15 | Josep Corbí (University of Valencia)
Commemoration, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethical Wound |
| 12.20-13.35 | Takuya Niikawa (Kobe University) & Snow Li (University of New South Wales & Kobe University)
The Welfare of Caregivers for People with Dementia |
| 13.40-14.00 | Signing Ceremony for the Kobe-Valencia Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation for Research Partnership |
Organizing Committee: Christian Carbonell, Miguel Gramage, Sergi Rosell and Chon Tejedor
Scientific Committee: Maria Alvarez (KCL), Carla Bagnoli (U. Modena and Reggio Emilia), Josep Corbí (UV), Sergi Rosell (UV), Chon Tejedor (UV) and Jesús Vega (UAM)
ABSTRACTS
Is complicity unjust or superfluous?
Christopher Bennett (University of Sheffield)
In this talk I look at why we need the moral category of complicity. I will understand complicity in a narrow sense, as secondary liability arising from the wrongdoing of others, independently of responsibility for one’s own wrongdoing. I defend the possibility of secondary liability against three main lines of criticism: that it is unjust; that it dilutes or undermines genuine responsibility (because, as Hannah Arendt says, where all are guilty none are); and that, if the previous problems can be fixed, it is redundant. I propose an understanding of secondary liability based on my previous work on expressive action. I argue that we will better understand secondary liability if we consider how it is similar to but different from the expressive action of dissociation as a way of marking responsible wrongdoing. Some connections to wrongdoing for which we are not culpable may still call to be marked symbolically. I argue that the resulting view avoids the three criticisms and shows why we need judgements of secondary liability.
Commemoration, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethical Wound
Josep Corbí (University of Valencia)
I argue that full-fledged commemoration of the Ethical Wound involves an attitude that goes beyond forgiveness and atonement as well as a process of self-transformation. I will finally stress, however, that the same epistemic capacities —say, aspect perception— that make full-fledged commemoration possible render it both elusive and a consolatory illusion.
Structures, Agency, and Perception: A Gibsonian Account of Perceptual Practices
Miguel Gramage (University of Valencia)
In his influential account of social structures, William H. Sewell (1992) argues that structure and agency are mutually constitutive: while structures constrain agency, they are simultaneously sustained through the practices of agents. In this paper, I propose an interpretation of this duality in terms of the perception of affordances. I argue that structures shape agency by prioritizing certain affordances over others. However, I reject the view that this prioritization necessarily involves conscious selection by the agent. Instead, I contend that perception itself is an activity best understood in terms of perceptual practices.
The Welfare of Caregivers for People with Dementia, Takuya Niikawa (Kobe University) & Snow Li (University of New South Wales at Sydney & Kobe University)
This talk introduces findings from a cross-cultural qualitative study examining what it is like for caregivers to take care of their family members with dementia. Grounded in the conceptual framework of the “we-relationship”, defined by joint actions and the use of “we” language, the study draws on 38 in-depth interviews conducted in Australia and Japan. Our analysis highlights how caregivers actively strive to maintain or re-establish a sense of “we-ness” through shared routines, emotional attunement, and meaning-making practices, showing that these efforts are closely linked to the well-being of both the caregiver and the person with dementia.
Individual Responsibilities and the Danger of Self-Deception in Responses to Climate Change, Ryan Manhire (Abo Akademi University)
My talk takes as its starting point a version of what Chon Tejedor describes as an ‘agency-stultifying situation’ (Tejedor 2023) in relation to the cumulative harm of climate change. I suggest that attempts to honestly acknowledge the individual responsibilities and dues arising from an honest assessment of ‘one’s place in the world’ as a response to this difficulty may often involve a second difficulty: A form of Wittgensteinian ‘world-picture chaos’ (OC 613, 490) arising from an acknowledgement of the reality of climate change that destabilises a sense of one’s place in the world. I consider two ways that an ordinary individual might succumb to forms of self-deception in their attempts to regain a sense of certainty in relation to both aspects of this ‘double difficulty’. First, an overzealous approach to what one takes to be the sole path available to attend to one’s individual responsibilities, with disastrous consequences. Second, a deflection away from one’s individual responsibilities via an accusation that responsibility for the cumulative harm ultimately lies with other ordinary individuals. To illustrate versions of these two forms of self-deception, I draw on examples from two environmentalist films: Paul Schrader’s (2017) First Reformed and Adam McKay’s (2021) Don’t Look Up. What I take my discussion to show is that though the ‘double difficulty’ I propose may present an additional difficulty to some ‘agency stultifying situations’, it nevertheless strengthens Tejedor’s (2020) emphasis both on the importance of ongoing relationality in addressing the difficulty, as well as the ever-present risk of an insular dogmatic certainty that threatens to rupture this relationality.
Misunderstanding in Action: The Gap Between Intelligibility and Meaning-Making
Mercedes Rivero (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Rationality can usually be described as a human characteristic that facilitates adaptation to the environment in order to act within it. It allows us to develop plans of action, make decisions, and relate to others. Philosophy frequently links what is considered intelligible with what is rationally understandable. Intelligible knowledge is derived from the intellect’s analysis of a particular object or situation. Intelligibility, then, is understood as a disposition to make something understandable, thus endowing it with coherence and rationality.
It is important to distinguish between intelligibility and sense-making (or meaning-making). Intelligibility refers to the ability to understand and explain an action from a rational and logical perspective, while sensemaking refers to whether an action has a clear and understandable purpose or meaning. When intelligibility is disconnected from meaning-making in action, misunderstandings arise that lead to problems of communication and understanding between interacting agents. This work will focus on the causes that generate misunderstandings when action is affected by the disconnection of intelligibility and meaning-making.
The conclusion is that the agent does not relinquish her agency (she acts voluntarily and tries to be understood), although her actions sometimes deviate from intelligibility—making self-understanding difficult—and become disconnected from meaning-making. This produces misunderstandings within the agency. In other words, even if a specific action is intelligible for the agent, when performed, it may not make sense in relation to the context and the interactions of other people. Intelligibility and meaning-making become disconnected. This affects the communicative act and mutual (self-)understanding.
Insensitivity to Animals, Insensitivity to Responsibility: A Kantian Argument
Álvaro Rodríguez González (University of Sheffield)
Treating others as responsible agents plausibly requires a certain sensitivity to relevant features about them, that allow us to consider them as deliberative peers, as accountable for their actions, or generally as free beings whose actions were up to them. It is also plausible that we may promote or dull our sensitivity to these considerations by taking different outlooks into the world and acting accordingly. In this paper, I rehabilitate Kant’s argument for our indirect duties concerning animal well-being to contend that mistreating animals puts us at a worse position when it comes to detecting, acknowledging and reacting appropriately to some of the features that characterise responsible agency. I start by reconstructing a Kantian argument for this stance. This, however, relies on two highly contentious Kantian theses: responsibility is grounded in transcendental freedom, and we must judge organisms teleologically. I finish by contending that we can weaken these Kantian theses substantially to make them more broadly acceptable and still make a case that our sensitivity to the status of others as responsible agents is connected to our treatment of non-human animals.



This event is part of the research projects:
- The Epistemology of Responsibility in Agency-Stultifying Situations (PID2022-139226NB-I00), funded by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación – Gobierno de España, and the European Union
- Autonomy as Address (CIPROM/2023/55), funded by Conselleria d’Innovació, Universitats, Ciència i Societat Digital – Generalitat Valenciana.
