Marta Cabrera (Universitat de València): The Self in Emotions: Reflexivity, Proportionality and Narcissism

When:
20 November, 2020 @ 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
2020-11-20T11:30:00+01:00
2020-11-20T13:30:00+01:00
Where:
Seminari de Filosofia
Av. de Blasco Ibáñez
30, 46010 València, Valencia
Spain

The present work deals with the distinction that many philosophers have traced between reflexive and non-reflexive emotions. According to such distinction, the main difference between emotions such as shame, pride, guilt and embarrassment, and the rest of our emotions – fear, anger, sadness, joy, gratitude, etc. – is that the former are necessarily directed at the self as the intentional object of the experience, while the latter are directed at objects, people, states of affairs, events, etc. in the world other than the self (Helm 2001, Zinck 2008, Deonna and Teroni 2012, Teroni 2016 and Tietjen 2020). In this talk, I wish to provide some reasons that may hopefully show how such contrast constitutes an important mischaracterisation of both our so-called reflexive and non-reflexive emotions.

I will introduce the problem of narcissism or, what I will call, the narcissistic configuration of an emotional response, and suggest that the standard distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive emotions construes reflexive emotions under such paradigm. In order to argue for this suggestion, I will make reference to Bernard William’s remarkable analyses of shame and the contrast he draws between the shame that one feels on the basis of what others will think of oneself and feeling shame at the harm caused to another (1993: 84). On my reading, William’s analysis opens up the possibility of an alternative account of shame – and of the so-called reflexive emotions in general – in which the self is not necessarily the object of this emotion. It is nonetheless always possible for the subject’s attention, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, etc. to shift from the object of shame and become exclusively focussed on herself during an experience of shame, in which case, what we seem to have is the narcissistic or degraded version of shame. The fact that the object of shame not only calls for a specific emotional response but also for a certain kind of attention towards it implies that, in the narcissistic case, the emotion of the subject is not a proportional response to its legitimate object. More importantly, it implies that a non-narcissistic kind of shame would focus on an external object other than on one’s self-image. More specifically, non-narcissistic shame would focus on what the agent has done and recognises as constituting a harm or a disrespect to others.

The notion of perspectival displacement introduced by Robert Dunn (2006) will help me to account for the shift of focus that seems to be at place in the narcissist’s experience. I will argue that in every emotional experience, and not just in the case of pride, shame, embarrassment and guilt, it is possible for the subject to shift her attention from the object of her emotion to herself. The displacement of one’s attention to oneself during an emotional experience might not be as extreme as in the case of narcissism, and there might be many intermediate intelligible options between a total subject-focussing and a total object-focussing. As I will try to show, this proposal seems to apply both to our so-called reflexive and non-reflexive emotions, which appears to be in contradiction with such a sharp distinction.