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Pleasure was a topic of considerable interest and debate among philosophers in early China. It figured prominently in certain foundational texts of the early Confucian and Daoist traditions, where it was central to discussions of the nature of the good life and of what it meant to realize oneself as a human being. While these texts often warned against the potential dangers of pursuing certain forms of pleasure, they also maintained that, despite these ever-present dangers, there was nothing inherently problematic with pleasure as such. Indeed, a virtuous and fully realized life was one that was accompanied by pleasure. Although the positive normative evaluation of pleasure is fairly well-documented, basic questions of what pleasure is, what confers such normativity to it, and why it came to be a topic of philosophical importance have not received sustained examination. The goal of my paper is to address these questions in the Mencius, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi – three key early mainstream texts from the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE that carve out, in their various ways, a significant ethical role for pleasure. I proceed by reconstructing the explanatory contexts in which pleasure was invoked, as well as the functions that pleasure performed in these contexts – a task that involves taking a step into the “metaphysics” of pleasure. My discussion thus considers pleasure not only as a psychological, moral or political phenomenon, but as a crucial node within a shifting conceptual map of the workings of reality, and of human beings as part of this reality. I argue that the recognition of pleasure’s ethical importance in mainstream philosophical discourse in early China corresponded to an emergent awareness of the human potentiality for cognitive and practical mastery of the world, and to the heightened association of pleasure with such mastery.
